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The concept of Mobility as a Service (MaaS) is seeing increasing attention from researchers, industry, 
and the public sector. MaaS, which posits that traditional models of car ownership and travel may be 
supplanted by models focused on packages of shared vehicle access, use of public transport, active 
transport, and teleworking, is currently viewed as having potential beneficial impacts including 
reductions in single-occupancy vehicle trips, with concomitant reductions in travel cost, congestion, 
and environmental concerns. MaaS, however, relies upon a number of social expectations, including 
trust, reliability, and transparency, each of which is reliant upon both the social network that 
enables MaaS to work efficiently, and upon the ways in which data are handled within the enabling 
framework. In light of this, it is anticipated that the recently-enacted General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) has the potential to significantly impact upon the further implementation of 
MaaS. MaaS services are predicated upon the sharing of personal travel information (vehicle 
availability, origins, destinations, financial information, social network data, etc.) that, under GDPR, 
may be considered personal, subject to the regulations and restrictions this categorisation implies. 
For MaaS to work in a European context, then, it must be responsive to GDPR requirements related 
to issues such as Privacy by Design, Consent, and Protection. In this paper, we explore the concept of 
MaaS in relation to privacy considerations raised by GDPR requirements, with attention to methods 
and techniques related to relevant data acquisition, sharing, and protection processes. A case study 
of the Whim application’s privacy policy is presented to demonstrate the potential implications of 

















The concept of Mobility as a Service (commonly referred to as MaaS) is seeing increasing attention 
from researchers, industry, and the public sector in keeping with heightened expectations for 
personal mobility and rising concerns for the environmental health of urban spaces. MaaS, which 
posits that traditional models of car ownership and individual trips may be supplanted by models 
focused on packages of shared vehicle access, use of public transport, active transport, and 
teleworking, is currently viewed as a new way forward, with potential beneficial impacts including 
reductions in single-occupancy vehicle trips, with concomitant reductions in cost to individuals, 
congestion, air pollution, and surface runoff from parking pavement. While the potential for such 
benefits is great, however, realising them is contingent upon ensuring that MaaS systems are 
responsive to end-user expectations and that the underpinning technology and data platform are 
acceptable to service providers. A particular area that is of relevance and interest to both end users 
and service providers is that of data privacy.  
Effective MaaS systems are reliant upon both the social networks that enable them to work 
efficiently and capably, and upon the way in which data are handled within their enabling 
frameworks. While the providers of MaaS services cannot guarantee that every user will behave in 
accordance with the regulatory guidance that they set forward, they can develop user systems that 
encourage good behaviour and minimise potential negative impacts in the spirit of meeting the 
necessary expectations. While the importance of addressing privacy considerations in this context 
has been raised in a number of publications, including Jittrapirom et al. (2018), which identified 
privacy as a potential constraint to meeting MaaS objectives, it has not yet been comprehensively 
addressed with respect to the underlying privacy considerations raised by extensive access to 
identifiable location data, with potential distribution across multiple service providers. 
In light of this, it is anticipated that the current privacy concerns addressed by the recently enacted 
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has the potential for significant impacts upon 
the further implementation of MaaS. MaaS services are often predicated upon the sharing of 
personal information related to travel: vehicle availability, current origin, planned destination, 
financial information, social network data, and others. Under GDPR, this data may be considered 
personal, and is subject to the regulations and restrictions this categorisation implies. For MaaS to 
work in a European context, then, it must be responsive to GDPR requirements related to issues 
such as Privacy by Design, Consent, Protection, and Security. It must, in short, respond to an 
environment that both demands data revelations and protects them. In this paper, we explore and 
examine privacy issues in the provision of Mobility as a Service systems, and how these may relate to 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). We review a case study example of a MaaS-related 
privacy policy for the WHIM app that is response to the GDPR, in order to demonstrate the various 
considerations that GDPR requirements demand of MaaS service providers. We hope that the paper 
will serve both to establish a baseline understanding of the implications of the GDPR for MaaS 
providers and projects, and a proactive method for ensuring that emerging projects benefit from the 
trust and security enhancements anticipated from an increased focus on data protection. 
In this paper, we begin by introducing the place of privacy and security in the transport context, 
followed by a detailed overview of Mobility as a Service and expected impacts on its feasibility under 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This will be followed by a more robust discussion of 
potential methods currently under consideration for responding to GDPR requirements, and an 
overview of an example policy reflective of GDPR considerations. The review of the Whim 
application’s privacy policy provides an example of how current MaaS service providers are 
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responding to requirements imposed by the GDPR, and how this may impact upon their treatment 
of consumer data, and how that treatment is communicated to the user.  
Privacy and Security in the Transport Context 
In the Ministerial Forward to the Public Consultation for the Security of Network and Information 
Security Directive, the Rt Hon Matt Hancock (Minister of State for Digital) wrote, “Our modern 
economy, and the economic security it brings, are all themselves based on secure infrastructure. 
Network and information systems and the essential services they support play a vital role in society, 
from ensuring the supply of electricity, water, and health services, to provision of passenger and 
freight transport (P.4, 2017).” The inclusion of passenger and freight transport in this list 
underscores the critical role that the sector plays in the functioning of a stable, economically sound 
society. In addition, the recognition of transport as sitting within a network context highlights the 
diversity of interests involved in the transport context – from users and passenger service providers, 
to infrastructure for physical and information services, to freight and logistics interests.  
For the network to function efficiently, however, and to best serve the interests required of it, 
modern transport systems rely on robust data sources, collected from a wide variety of providers, 
and used for a number of different purposes. Some of these sources may include the following, as 
defined by George et al. (2014): 
• Data: Data typically held by governments, governmental organizations or local 
communities. These data are generally available for widespread use, and may include 
Census and transport data, or energy use. 
• Private Data: Data acquired and held by private firms, third sector organisations or 
individuals. These data can generally not be obtained via public source data resources 
and may include proprietary information such as mobile phone usage, data from RFID 
tags, or data on freight movements. 
• Data Exhaust (or passive data): ‘Ambient’ data, passively collected and not core to the 
specific activities of the collecting agency. While of limited value as standalone data sets, 
they are often useful when combined with other data sources. Such data may include 
internet search histories, location traces from mobile phones, or interaction records.  
• Community Data: Unstructured data captured, for example, as part of social 
interactions, such as online reviews/ratings, or social media feeds (such as Twitter or 
Facebook). These data can be analysed and structured to infer meaningful patterns (e.g., 
Cottrill et al., 2017). 
• Self-Quantification Data: Data revealed by individuals through self-monitoring or 
tracking, such as through the use of personal fitness trackers. 
Actors in the transport realm are increasingly making use of combinations of these data sets for 
service provision, project and network planning, modelling, and programming (Zhao et al., 2015; 
Cottrill and Derrible, 2015; Çolak et al., 2015). Pigni et al. (2016), for example, cite the example of 
Uber, which “…owns no vehicles, but harnesses a real-time digital data stream of its drivers’ cars and 
matches them with real-time demand for rides (p. 5).” Zheng et al (2016), in turn, indicate a number 
of examples of the use of multiple forms of data for transport projects, including cell phone and WiFi 
data; social media data from Facebook, Twitter, Waze, and other social media services; incident 
reports; and location-enabled web logs, such as Foursquare. They note that, “In terms of data 
contents, social transportation data record Time, GPS coordinates, Velocity, Accelerated Velocity, 
Address, Texts, Video etc. For each type of social transportation data, the recorded contents are 
specific to one or several aspects of human mobility, and specific to information of a person or a 
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community (p. 621).” Such a variety of data sources and uses, as well as the identification of the 
likely specificity of this to individual actors, provides a sense of the scope of privacy concerns 
emerging in the current transport ecosystem.  
Given the multiplicity of actors involved in the collection and use of relevant data, including 
government agencies, academic and research organisations, commercial entities, and third-sector 
organisations, the landscape for collection and handling concerns such as privacy and security may 
be inconsistent or fragmented (Jagadish et al., 2014; Patire et al., 2015; Goşman et al., 2016). In 
particular, the increasing spatial disaggregation of services through which data may be generated 
and collected (for example, Twitter is headquartered in California, USA, but its services are 
accessible worldwide, with data storage centres likewise distributed worldwide (Hashemi, 2017)) 
introduces additional complexity into the regulatory landscape, as multiple geographic scales may 
need to be considered. The use of cloud computing for storage or transmission of data used in 
transport applications is a useful case, as these may be domestic or cross-border. According to 
Svantesson and Clarke (2010), “…extraterritorial application of privacy laws risk being ineffective due 
to the difficulties associated with cross-border enforcement…[T]he simple fact is that today, it is 
extremely difficult for victims of privacy violations to obtain redress where the violation has 
occurred outside the victim’s home country (p. 393).” In such situations, consumers may be unclear 
as to the extent to which their data are protected, or the geographic extent to which that protection 
applies.  Such considerations may, in turn, impact upon both the usefulness and completeness of 
data sets due to lack of consumer understanding or trust, evidenced by modifying privacy settings or 
providing false data (Keith et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2014).   
Such issues of privacy and security are critical in the transport realm, as geotagged or otherwise 
location-enabled data represent valuable inputs into the transport data ecosystem (Buckley and 
Lightman 2015; Kitchin 2014). However, location data collected from personal devices or aligned to 
identifiable individuals can also be highly revealing, as it can be used to create detailed traces of an 
individual’s behaviour over time (Freudiger et al, 2011; Andrienko et al. 2013). According to de 
Montjoye et al. (2013), “…in a dataset where the location of an individual is specified hourly, and 
with a spatial resolution equal to that given by the carrier's antennas, four spatio-temporal points 
are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the individuals (p. 1).”  Such findings indicate the extent to 
which location data, particularly in combination with other types of data as indicated above, may 
cast strong doubt on an individual’s right to privacy or expectation of security. While actions may be 
taken by the user (such as turning the device off or disabling location tracking) or the data collector 
(such as aggregating data or removing individual identifiers) to minimise the risk of privacy 
disclosure, such actions are not foolproof. In addition, taking such actions may also impact 
negatively upon the functionality of location-based services, which require detailed location 
information (often combined with personal preferences, habits, or social networks) to work most 
efficiently.  
Introducing the MaaS context 
The MaaS Alliance describes Mobility as a Service as, “…the integration of various forms of transport 
services into a single mobility service accessible on demand. To meet a customer’s request, a MaaS 
operator facilitates a diverse menu of transport options, be they public transport, ride-, car- or bike-
sharing, taxi or car rental/lease, or a combination thereof. For the user, MaaS can offer added value 
through use of a single application to provide access to mobility, with a single payment channel 
instead of multiple ticketing and payment operations (MaaS Alliance, n.d.).” Kamargianni et al. 
(2016) further develop the underlying expectations of MaaS by identifying three main elements that 
are needed within MaaS systems to provide users with seamless journeys, including:  
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• “Ticket & Payment integration: when one smart card or ticket can be used to access all the 
modes taking part in the service and one account is charged for the use of those services; 
• Mobility package: when customers can pre-pay for a specific amount (in time or distance) of 
a combination of mobility services; 
• ICT integration: when there is a single application or online interface that can be used to 
access information about the modes (p. 3295).” 
These elements, which highlight the importance of both service integration and the place of 
technology in facilitating access to MaaS, underscore the critical place of data and its’ uses within 
MaaS service provision. An additional layer is added by Kamargianni and Matyas (2017) when they 
look more closely at the ‘business ecosystem’ underlying MaaS, which they classify into three layers: 
the core business layer, which comprises the MaaS provider, transport operators and customers; the 
extended enterprise layer, which consists of more technical firms, such as those providing back-end 
technical service, and payment and journey planning services; and the business ecosystem, which 
includes regulators and policy makers, researchers, unions, media and marketing firms and others 
(Kamargianni and Matyas, 2017).  The multiplicity of identified involved interests further illustrates 
the complexity of the regulation of MaaS services.  
In addition to this ecosystem of actors involved with providing MaaS services, it is generally expected 
that the mechanisms that will allow MaaS offerings to take place will be built upon easily-accessible 
platforms, likely available via, for example, a smartphone app. According to Jittrapirom et al. (2017), 
“MaaS relies on a digital platform (mobile app or web page) through which the end-users can 
access…all the necessary services for their trips: trip planning, booking, ticketing, payment, and real-
time information. Users might also access other useful services, such as weather forecasting, 
synchronization with personal activity calendar, travel history report, invoicing, and feedback (p. 
16).” The authors further identify the following as core characteristics of MaaS systems: 
• Integration of transport modes 
• Tariff option 
• One platform 
• Multiple actors 
• Use of technologies 
• Demand orientation 
• Registration requirement 
• Personalisation 
• Customisation (Jittrapirom et al., 2017) 
In addition to these overarching characteristics, Kamargianni et al (2016) have created an index that 
also looks at types of integration included in MaaS services, identifying four key areas that include: 
ticket integration, payment integration, ICT integration, and mobility package integration. The extent 
to which a MaaS service meets each of these types may have a substantial impact on the degree to 
which collected data may need to be shared among members of the business ecosystem, and, in 
turn, what expectations the user may have with respect to the likely use of provided data. 
Meeting the needs of a fully integrated MaaS service that includes the core characteristics identified 
above will require the user to share a significant amount of personal information. To facilitate 
registration, some services (such as UbiGo ) allow users to register via Facebook or Google, which 
improves convenience, but may bring into question to amount of data being shared between the 
MaaS service and the Single Sign On (SSO) system. While the use of SSOs is becoming more 
standard, Eagleman (2013) has found that, “…despite demonstrating a broad understanding of data 
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collection practices, users are unlikely to notice nuances, which we believe is due to habituation. 
Thus, improvements are needed to highlight data collection practices that are likely to diverge from 
users' expectations (p. 2369).” While such practices are useful for the service provider, as they 
provide a familiar platform for users and may allow access to certain useful profile information, they 
may also bring to the forefront questions of user data and its’ transferability. If a bespoke 
registration is required, this would likely consist of information that could further be used for 
personalisation and customisation of the service, thus requiring both standard registration 
information (such as name, contact information (email and phone number), and age and/or gender), 
as well as more targeted information (such as preferred travel modes and habits, access to a vehicle, 
presence or absence of a driving license, etc.). Further, the ability to schedule payment through the 
service will also necessitate that the user link his or her financial information, adding another layer 
of ‘static’ data to the profile.  
When combined with time- and location-specific travel behaviour data needed to provide efficient 
services, these data have the potential to create a detailed portrait of travellers. Given that MaaS 
platforms may include both public and private service providers (with the potential of incorporating 
crowdsourcing for services such as shared rides or carpooling), access to these data sets will need to 
be carefully controlled in order to minimise privacy and security concerns. It is here where 
implications of the GDPR must be carefully considered. 
Implications of the GDPR 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, (EU) 2016/679), which was approved by the EU 
Parliament on 14th April 2016 and became fully enforceable as of 25th May 2018, replaced the EU’s 
Data Protection Directive (DPD - Directive 95/46/EC). Though some areas remain broadly consistent 
with the DPD, in many ways the regulation is responsive to the broad array of technological changes 
that have occurred in the past 20 years. According to the EC, “The aim of the GDPR is to protect all 
EU citizens from privacy and data breaches in an increasingly data-driven world that is vastly 
different from the time in which the 1995 directive was established. Although the key principles of 
data privacy still hold true to the previous directive, many changes have been proposed to the 
regulatory policies… (EUGDPR, 2017)” As with the DPD, the GDPR is applicable to personal data and 
sensitive personal data. The definitions of these have, however, changed somewhat – particularly 
that for personal data – in ways that have implications for the transport sector. Under the GDPR, 
personal data is defined as, “‘…any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person (GDPR, 2016; emphasis 
added).” The specific inclusion of both location data and online identifiers in this definition 
represents a change from the DPD, and has the potential to impact upon how MaaS services are 
offered and managed. Other key changes of the GDPR with the potential for impacting upon MaaS 
include the following: 
• The GDPR increases the territorial scope of applicability, as it applies to all companies 
that process personal data of EU citizens, regardless of where the company is located. 
• Requirements for obtaining consent have also been strengthened and place more onus 
on companies to provide consent language that is clear and easily accessible to the user. 
It must also be as easy to withdraw as to provide consent. 
• The requirement to consider Privacy by Design has been codified into the regulation, 
which indicates that: “The controller shall…implement appropriate technical and 
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organisational measures...in an effective way…in order to meet the requirements of this 
Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects (GDPR, 2016).” 
• Those data controllers and processors whose core activities consist of processing 
operations requiring large-scale, regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects or 
monitoring of special categories of data will be required to appoint a Data Protection 
Officer (DPO). 
• Individuals are provided with the ‘right to be forgotten’, i.e. the user may request that 
the responsible data controller remove his or her personal data and cease any further 
dissemination of the data. This is also aligned with increased rights of the individual to 
obtain information on whether his or her personal data are being processed and, if so, 
where and for what purposes. (EUGDPR, 2017) 
While this presents only in the broadest terms the areas of the GDPR that have the potential for 
implications on how MaaS services are provided and accessed, it is anticipated that other issues will 
emerge over time. For example, Costantini (2017) states, “…the real possibility that the user could 
be not only profiled but also “singled out” has raised many concerns, which become more sensitive 
in MaaS due the increasing number of interconnected databases. For example, it could be possible 
to find a pattern in a user’s movements to and from healthcare facilities, and so correlate travels to 
certain diseases…in [which case] they would qualify as “data concerning health” by Article 4 §. 1 (15) 
of GDPR29 (p. 7).” Such concerns highlight the privacy issues inherent in the collection and 
monitoring of transport information over time, and the potential for them to reveal personal data. 
The GDPR is applicable to data controllers and processors, defined in the regulation as follows: 
• ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body 
which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are 
determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its 
nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law; and 
• ‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body 
which processes personal data on behalf of the controller… (GDPR, 2016) 
Under these definitions, it is evident that MaaS service provision will include both data controllers 
and processors, meaning that their activities will come under the scope of the GDPR. How 
considerations around the collection, sharing and processing of the types of data identified in the 
activities above will be addressed is, therefore, a timely and relevant question. This is further 
demonstrated in the amount of attention that the issue of GDPR in the transport sector has 
attracted from the legal sector. The Moovit app (https://moovitapp.com/), for example, published 
an updated privacy policy on the 21st of May, 2018 (immediately before full enactment of the GDPR), 
with the explicit statement that, “We have updated our Privacy Notice as part of our commitment to 
the high standard of data privacy protection introduced by the new European data protection law 
known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Protection of your data and privacy has 
always been a top priority for us and that has not changed (Moovit, 2018).” 
Some of the key areas of response that are relevant for MaaS practices are related to how data are 
obtained, accessed, shared, processed, and stored. Addressing these considerations in MaaS is 
further complicated by the multiplicity of actors involved – drawing together services from a number 
of providers and providing adequate data to make their practices efficient and accurate will require 
careful management of data streams, making sure that data practices are consistent, and 
establishing adequate security of personal information. The requirement for privacy by design, 
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defined as ‘an approach to protecting privacy by embedding it into the design specifications of 
information technologies, accountable business practices, and networked infrastructures, right from 
the outset (Cavoukian, 2011)’, would additionally impose the requirement that these considerations 
be made from the outset of the development of the MaaS project or consortium. Some of the key 
practices that should be codified in any MaaS agreement include the following: 
• Development of consistent consent language that is clear and understandable, and 
adequately represents the underlying practices of relevant parties. 
• Incorporation of Privacy by Design principles in the system architecture, particularly in 
instances where the sharing of data between processors is necessary for service 
provision or utilisation. 
• Determine ways to minimise collection of data where possible. 
• Establish consistent practices for users to request the removal of data, and methods of 
compliance across involved partners. 
• Appoint a Data Protection Officer. 
While these represent some initial steps that may be taken to ensure compliance with GDPR, it is 
evident that much scope for further evaluation remains. 
Case Study: The Whim App 
The Whim App was launched in the Birmingham, West Midlands area of England in April of 2018, 
following a previous rollout in Helsinki, Finland and with planned expansions in Greater Amsterdam 
in the Netherlands, the Antwerp region in Belgium, and Singapore by the end of 2018 (Intelligent 
Transport, 2018). According to MaaS Global, which has developed and launched the app: ‘Whim 
makes mobility easier and seamless to West Midlands passengers in many ways: 
• All in one app: Whim is the key to mobility. With just one click, you get access to National 
Express bus and metro tickets, routes and timetables and Gett taxis. 
• Travel your way: Pay-as-you-go for multi-transport tickets with few clicks or get a monthly 
fixed-price package to cover all your daily journeys. 
• Plan travel in advance or go on a Whim: Never miss the bus again. Whim syncs with your 
calendar and removes the hassle of travel planning. Also, get instant travel 
recommendations for spontaneous mobility with just a few clicks (MaaS Global, N.D.).’ 
The Whim privacy policy as of July 2018 was last updated on 24 May 2018 – the day before full 
enactment of GDPR. The policy itself reflects some of the core GDPR requirements as noted above, 
with particular attention to issues of comprehension (the policy scores a 12.6 Flesch-Kinkaid grade 
level, which correlates to a first-year university student, as opposed to an average of 14.6, or a 
second or third year university student, as found in Cottrill and Thakuriah (2011)) and observation of 
transparency regarding the collection of both personal and non-personal data. The policy (which is 
available online at https://whimapp.com/privacy/) provides a detailed overview of the types of data 
collected both through registration and through use of the app, including the following (MaaS 
Global, 2018): 
• Information collected directly from the consumer: 
o Basic personal details: Most notably telephone number, which is requested when a 
user registers and acts as the account ID.   
o Additional personal details: These may include name, email address, and street 
address. Depending upon use of the app, this may also include information on 
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devices used, home country, language, credit card details and other payment 
details. It is noted that this information is needed to ensure that MaaS Global can 
process any payments made through the app. They also inform users that they use 
third party payment processors who will request and process details related to 
payments, which information will not be stored by MaaS Global. Third party log-in 
systems are also used, which may link Whim information with, for example, 
Facebook log-in and other information.  
o Verification data: If necessary, Whim may at times require additional information 
such as personal identity number, photo, or driver’s license details. This may be 
necessary if, for example, a car is being booked through the app.  
• Information collected through use of Whim services:   
o Transaction information:  Transaction records, including purchases, downloads, 
user-provided content, requests, agreements, services provided, delivery details and 
other interactions (including customer care) will be recorded and stored.  
o Positioning and location data: Whim makes use of location-based services, which 
establish the user’s location through the use of satellite, mobile, Wi-Fi or other 
network based positioning methods. Location information gathered in these ways 
may be personally identifying, particularly if linked to a unique device, and may be 
shared with and stored by MaaS Global. Users are informed of the reasons for 
collecting this data, and are informed that it will not be used without consent.  
o Travel data: According to the Whim Privacy Policy, “We store information about 
your trips. This includes the start and end points of the trip, the start and end times 
of the trip, the method of travel, and the cost. This information is associated with 
your unique user identifier. This information is vital for the functioning of the 
service, as it allows us to provide the service and to ensure the trip provider is 
compensated for the trip (MaaS Global, 2018).”  
o Other trip and travel related data include favourite locations, which may be stored 
on a map, and calendar data, which is an optional setting that allows users to 
request additional reminders and plans.  
o Other data: Non-personal data, such as IP address, access time, browsing habits, 
and other metadata associated with use of the app, may also be collected. While 
generally non-identifiable, if linked with other data it may become identifiable, in 
which case it will be treated in accordance with the privacy policy 
The amount of data collected through the Whim App and service, and the note regarding third party 
processors reflects the complexity of privacy considerations in MaaS applications. A stylised, high-




Figure 1: High-level conceptualisation of a MaaS-style data ecosystem (portions modified from König 
et al, 2016) 
The Whim Privacy Policy, in addition to providing information on types of data collected, further 
provides information on the use of said data, and how it will be shared and treated with respect to 
third party interests, such as payment processors and hosting providers, which whom data will be 
shared. With respect to the latter, it is notable that they indicate the following: “As most other 
service providers, we store and process your personal data (if any) on third party servers (” Hosting 
Providers”). The Hosting Providers we have chosen enable us to keep your data in the European 
Economic Area (MaaS Global, 2018).” Such a territorial observation is notable, particularly when 
looked at in conjunction with the following statement (under “Disclosure of the Information to Third 
Parties”): “Our products and services may be provided using resources and servers located in various 
countries around the world. Therefore your personal data may be transferred across international 
borders outside the country where you use our services, including to countries outside the European 
Economic Area (EEA). In such cases we ensure that there is a legal basis for such a transfer and that 
adequate protection for your personal data is provided as required by applicable law... (MaaS 
Global, 2018).”  Such a statement provides an implicit recognition of territorial requirements of the 
GDPR.  
The privacy policy also indicates current approaches being taken for privacy and security, including 
the following: 
• We use industry standard security mechanisms to protect the collected personal data. All 
collected personal data is stored in protected databases located behind a firewall and with 
both physical and software-based access controls provided by our Hosting Provider. 
• Our payment providers are PCI-DSS Level 1 certified. 
• We pseudonymise and encrypt the personal data; 
• We have a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of 
technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing (MaaS 
Global, 2018). 
While useful in terms of indicating that the approach being taken is responsive to privacy 
considerations raised in MaaS applications, the degree to which it may be easily understood by the 
layperson is questionable – PCI-DSS Level 1 certified and pseudonymisation may not be concepts 
with which the general public are familiar, for example. However, information is provided regarding 
how to request that data are deleted or removed from the system. 
11 
 
The Whim Privacy Policy is a useful example for understanding how the GDPR may impact upon 
MaaS applications in the future. While it presents only surface information, without explicitly 
demonstrating the underlying technical and network considerations that allow for functionality, it 
does demonstrate how critical information may be usefully shared with users in more 
understandable language, as well as addressing some of the core concerns of the GDPR in terms of 
how it relates to location-based services. As a publicly-facing portion of the project, developing 
effective privacy policies that provide critical information to the user without overwhelming them 
with technical considerations will be an increasingly important element of app and system design, 
and should reflect ‘privacy by design’ principles in action. 
Conclusion 
Given rapidly evolving models of transport service provision, it is essential to ensure that their 
underlying data resources are managed in a way that is compliant with regulations, acceptable to 
consumers and responsive to provider needs in a competitive environment. Mobility as a Service 
environments represent complex networks of public and private service providers and users, with a 
multiplicity of data resources including open data (such as public transport schedules), commercially 
sensitive data (including fees and service availability), and personal user data (such as financial 
information and travel plans). In the context of such an ecosystem, consumer trust is a critical factor. 
The potential for individual travellers to be uniquely identified through their travel behaviours is 
significant, and ensuring adequate protection, and communicating this effectively, will be necessary 
to fully meet societal expectations.  
To realise the potential offered by MaaS, then, it is necessary to ensure that the value-adding 
activities they enable, such as analysis of consumer needs and enrichment of data ecosystems, are 
supported by effective data management. The full benefits, however, can only be realized if these 
processes are driven by and managed in the context of agreed data protection policies and 
regulations to ensure that data producers continue to provide and share data with commercial 
entities. Such data management is becoming an increasingly complex and sensitive issue, with 
disparate data streams being sourced from multiple providers (including the individual traveller) and 
brought together for applications across the transport network, some of which were intended from 
the point of collection, but others of which opportunistically draw upon relevant populations and 
attributes to enhance the overall available information. The geographic scope of such applications is 
also increasingly complex, as MaaS services and their technology platforms may be spatially 
removed from the populations they serve. 
As affected organisations continue to refine their approaches to General Data Protection Regulation 
compliance, it is evident that it will have serious implications for the potential development of 
Mobility as a Service applications. There is clearly a need for more targeted attention to be given to 
how technological and policy measures may be used to ensure compliance with the various 
emerging considerations and that users are confident that their data are being handled 
appropriately. Given the multiplicity of interests involved in MaaS provision, as indicated in the 
Whim case study, it will be critical to ensure that privacy issues and response to GDPR are raised 
early and that all involved parties are working with consistent and transferrable approaches that are 
accurately and clearly conveyed to the user. To do so will be beneficial not only to the service 
providers, who will avoid compliance issues and potential fines, but also to the users, who will be 
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